Identificador / NVD
CVE-2026-19185
Ficha técnica de vulnerabilidade
Análise técnica
A análise em português ainda não foi gerada para esta CVE. Consulte a descrição original abaixo e o registro do NVD.
Descrição original do NVD
The system-call verifier for i3c_do_ccc() in drivers/i3c/i3c_handlers.c validated the outer struct i3c_ccc_payload, the broadcast ccc.data buffer and the targets.payloads[] array, but did not validate the per-target data buffers those array elements point at. Each struct i3c_ccc_target_payload carries its own data pointer and data_len, and neither was passed through K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() before the payload was handed to z_impl_i3c_do_ccc() and on to the controller driver. The verifier also operated on the caller's live structure rather than a snapshot, so validated fields could be changed by a second user thread between the check and the driver's use — unlike the sibling z_vrfy_i3c_transfer(), which has always copied its message array first. The defect is only present in CONFIG_USERSPACE builds, where drivers/i3c/i3c_handlers.c is compiled. An unprivileged user-mode thread that has been granted access to the I3C controller device object — the ordinary way an application lets a user thread talk to I3C peripherals — can issue a direct CCC whose target payload data pointer names an arbitrary kernel address. Controller drivers dereference that pointer directly (for example drivers/i3c/i3c_mcux.c, drivers/i3c/i3c_cdns.c, drivers/i3c/i3c_stm32.c, drivers/i3c/i3c_npcx.c), using rnw to decide direction. A read CCC therefore causes the kernel-mode driver to write bus-received bytes into an attacker-chosen kernel address for an attacker-chosen length, and a write CCC transmits kernel memory out onto the I3C bus. The result is an out-of-bounds kernel write plus a kernel memory disclosure, i.e. escalation from a user-mode thread to supervisor privilege, defeating the isolation CONFIG_USERSPACE is meant to provide. The fix introduces copy_ccc_and_do(), which snapshots the payload, copies the target array into kernel memory with k_usermode_alloc_from_copy() (bounding num_targets to fewer than 32), validates each per-target buffer with K_SYSCALL_MEMORY() according to rnw, and copies the driver-written num_xfer and err fields back to the caller.
Resposta recomendada
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CVSS mede severidade técnica. EPSS estima a probabilidade de exploração nos 30 dias seguintes à data do score.